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Abstract
Situations serving as worlds as well as events in linguistic semantics are formulated as strings recording
observations over discrete time. This formulation is applied to Priorean tense logic, in line with L. Schubert’s
distinction between described and characterized situations. The distinction is developed topologically and
computationally, and linked to the opposition between truth-conditional and proof-conditional semantics.
For a ﬁnitary handle on quantiﬁcation, the conception of situations-as-strings is extended from observation
to derivation.
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1 Introduction
Situations have over the years attracted varying degrees of attention in natural
language semantics ([15,2,8] and many others). They have been called on to do
the work of worlds for modality, and also the work of events in temporality. An
important contrast between these uses can be put in terms introduced by [16] as
that between description and characterization. To say that a formula ϕ describes
a situation/world s is to say that ϕ is true in s. To say that ϕ characterizes a
situation/event s is to say a bit more, as tautologies make plain: a formula true in
all worlds would be hard put to characterize any world.
An obvious problem is that a world may simply be too big. A situation/event of
Pat walking from the oﬃce to the train station ought not to include any subsequent
train rides. This suggests using a “part of” relation  on situations to express the
additional requirement characterization imposes on description. For instance, we
might reduce the claim that a formula ϕ characterizes a situation s to the description
and minimality condition in (1).
ϕ describes s, and ϕ describes no other situation  s(1)
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Such a reduction would imply (2).
whenever ϕ characterizes s, ϕ characterizes no other situation  s(2)
Although (2) poses no obvious problem for say, an event of Pat walking from the
oﬃce to the train station, diﬃculties arise when the modiﬁcation “from the oﬃce
to the train station” is dropped: it is widely accepted that an event of Pat walking
may have proper parts that count as Pat walking.
1.1 Characterization as the basis of description
Rather than reducing characterization to description, the approach pursued below
is to derive description from characterization of a -part, as in (3).
ϕ describes s iﬀ (∃s′  s) ϕ characterizes s′(3)
An immediate consequence of (3) and the transitivity of  is the persistence (4) of
description.
ϕ describes s whenever ϕ describes some s′  s(4)
Knockdown counter-examples from natural language applications to (4) are not
as easy to come by as for (2) above, given that in such applications, described
situations are paradigmatically worlds. As situations, worlds are generally assumed
to be -maximal, making (4) vacuously true for worlds s′. Certainly, instances of
characterization are, under (3) and a reﬂexive relation , instances of description.
But as (4) with characterization in place of description does not follow from (3), one
may view instances of non-persistence as characterization, rather than description.
1.2 Strings as ﬁnite observations and constructions
It is instructive to ﬂesh out the notion of characterization against formulas from
Priorean tense logic, assuming that next and previous moments are well-deﬁned. In
defense of this assumption, Prior writes
the usefulness of systems of this sort does not depend on any serious metaphysical
assumption that time is discrete 2 ; they are applicable in limited ﬁelds of discourse
in which we are concerned with what happens in a sequence of discrete states,
e.g. in the workings of a digital computer. ([13], page 67)
The distance to the previous/next moment is a matter of granularity, which we leave
open and reﬁnable by any ﬁnite number of observations. Accordingly, the Priorean
formula Past p saying that p held sometime in the past may be pictured as the
regular language
p ∗ now = p now + p  now + p  now + · · ·(5)
2 Commenting on [9], van der Does and van Lambalgen report
it seems to be a pervasive feature of our language faculty to turn analogue features into discrete ones;
e.g. the continuous scale of length is partitioned as: tall, medium, short . ([5], page 80)
In studies of temporality, it is notable that the precise moment of change (mentioned when discussing, for
example, telicity) can be pinned down only if that precision is bounded by discrete approximations of time.
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consisting of strings p n now of length n + 2 (for n ≥ 0), with substring n
representing n intervening moments between the observation of p and the present
(‘now’). Reversing these strings, we get the language
now ∗ p = now p + now  p + now  p + · · ·(6)
for the formula Future p saying that in the future p holds. Each of the strings
in (5) and (6) can, as a sequence of snapshots, be viewed as an event (e.g. [18]).
In contrast to the situations in [10], the snapshots here need not be an exhaustive
record of (atomic) propositions true at that moment. This partiality allows the
languages in (5) and (6) to be understood as the events characterized by Past p
and Future p, respectively. This is made precise in section 2, where strings are
reformulated as schedules and structured topologically by .
An obvious challenge to the ﬁnite-state approach sketched above is the Priorean
formula Future∀ p saying that p is true every moment after the present, pictured
in (7).
now p
∞
= lim
n→∞
now p
n
(7)
The computational complications posed by (7) and other temporal formulas (both
more and less complex than Future∀ p) are taken up in section 3, motivated by ap-
plications to natural language. This leads to a step from strings-as-observations to
strings-as-derivations. Very brieﬂy, the disjunctive normal form in a subbasis/basis
presentation of topologies makes way for the higher types of proof-conditional se-
mantics.
2 Schedules and topologies
It will prove convenient to
(i) identify time with the set Z of positive and non-positive integers, reserving 0
to mark out the present, and
(ii) push negation towards the atoms, ﬁxing a set P of propositions with a map
· : P → P such that for each p ∈ P , p = p but p = p.
Let us refer to a relation s ⊆ Z × P between integers and propositions in P as a
P -schedule, the idea being that s(i, p) says p is true at time i. For example, the
string p  now p, q corresponds to the P -schedule {(−3, p), (1, p), (1, q)},
for P ⊇ {p, q} with ‘now’ understood to be at 0. Let us call a ﬁnite P -schedule a
P -strip (as it can be written as a string in Pow(P ∪ {now})∗) and write Str (P ) for
the set
Str (P ) = {s ⊆ Z× P | s has ﬁnite cardinality}
of P -strips. A P -world is a P -schedule x such that for all p ∈ P and i ∈ Z,
x(i, p) iﬀ not x(i, p) .
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A P -situation is a P -schedule s such that s ⊆ x, for some P -world x. (In other
words, a P -situation is a P -schedule s such that for no i, p is it the case that s(i, p)
and s(i, p).) We equate the part-of relation  with the subset relation ⊆, and drop
the modiﬁcation P - on schedules, situations, strips and worlds when we can. This
section concerns topologies over sets X ⊆ Pow(Z× P ) of schedules induced by sets
of described schedules from a notion of characterization according to (3). Typically
(but not necessarily), X will be a set of worlds, and a characterized situation will
be a strip s, understood as a ﬁnite set of observations of any x ∈ X such that s ⊆ x.
2.1 Topologies based on ﬁnite observations
Applying the notion of characterization to a set A of schedules in place of a formula,
let us agree to read “s ∈ A” as A characterizes s, so that under (3), we have
A describes x iﬀ (∃s ⊆ x) s ∈ A .
Next, given a set X ⊆ Pow(Z× P ) of schedules, we deﬁne
(i) XA ⊆ X to be the set of schedules in X described by A
XA = {x ∈ X | (∃s ⊆ x) s ∈ A}
(ii) Fin(X) ⊆ Str(P ) to be the set of strips ⊆-contained in schedules in X
Fin(X) = {s ∈ Str (P ) | (∃x ∈ X) s ⊆ x}
and
(iii) O(X) ⊆ Pow(X) to be the family of subsets of X determined by sets A ⊆
Fin(X) of ﬁnite observations
O(X) = {XA | A ⊆ Fin(X)} .
Proposition 2.1 Let X ⊆ Pow(Z× P ).
(i) O(X) = {XA | A ⊆ Str(P )} and indeed for all A ⊆ Str (P ), XA = XA∩F in(X).
(ii) (X,O(X)) is a subspace of the topological space (Pow(Z×P ),O(Pow(Z×P ))).
(iii) For all A,B ⊆ Pow(Z× P ),
XA ∪XB = XA∪B
XA ∩XB = XA	B
where A B is deﬁned to be {s ∪ r | s ∈ A and r ∈ B}.
The topological space (X,O(X)) foregrounds the “reality” x ∈ XA ∈ O(X) that
is presumably observed, at the expense of the ﬁnite observations s ∈ A ⊆ Fin(X)
that shape O(X). An alternative that downplays the “points” x ∈ X and highlights
the observations is to endow Pow(Fin(X)) with the structure of a locale, consisting,
under the presentation in [19], of
(i) binary operations unionsqX and X given by
A unionsqX B = A ∪B
A X B = (A B) ∩ Fin(X)
for all A,B ⊆ Fin(X), and
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(ii) the set {yˆ | y ⊆ Z × P} of functions yˆ : Pow(Fin(X)) → {0, 1} given by a
schedule y such that for all A ⊆ Fin(X),
yˆ(A) = 1 iﬀ (∃s ∈ A) s ⊆ y .
A notion halfway between topological space and locale is that of a topological system
(X,Pow(Fin(X))) with satisfaction relation |= ⊆ X × Pow(Fin(X)) deﬁned by
x |= A iﬀ x ∈ XA
for all x ∈ X and A ⊆ Fin(X). From the topological system (X,Pow(Fin(X))),
Vickers derives the topological space (X,O(X)) by spatialization and the locale
({yˆ | y ⊆ Z × P},Pow(Fin(X))) by localiﬁcation. For our present purposes, the
situation is summarized in Table 1.
Vickers Schubert
topological system (X,Pow(Fin(X))) situation
topological space (X, {XA | A ⊆ Fin(X)}) point/world x describe (XA)
locale ({yˆ | y ⊆ Z× P},Pow(Fin(X))) strip/event s characterize (A)
Table 1. Vickers [19] applied to the situation in Schubert [16]
The remainder of this section is directed at developing the “pointless topology”-
perspective of locale theory (but not necessarily its abstractness), putting the set
Str (P ) of strips in center stage, and consigning the particular choice X of points
to the background. That said, we proceed from the point/world-oriented semantics
traditionally given to Priorean tense logic.
2.2 Temporal formulas and characterization
Given a set P◦ of atomic propositions, let
(i) P = P◦ × {+,−}, and for a ∈ P◦, (a,+) = (a,−) and (a,−) = (a,+), and
(ii) Φ be the set of temporal formulas ϕ generated from p ∈ P by
ϕ ::= p |  | ⊥ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Next ϕ | Previous ϕ |
ϕ until ϕ | ϕ since ϕ | ϕ release ϕ | ϕ initiate ϕ .
Building a Kripke frame around Z, we can interpret each formula ϕ ∈ Φ relative to
a function (valuation) v : Z → Pow(P◦) and integer i ∈ Z in the usual way, with
v, i |= p iﬀ xv(i, p)
where xv is the P -world
{(i, (a,+)) | i ∈ Z, a ∈ v(i)} ∪ {(i, (a,−)) | i ∈ Z, a ∈ P◦ − v(i)}
and v, i |= , v, i |= ⊥,
v, i |= ϕ ∧ ψ iﬀ v, i |= ϕ and v, i |= ψ
v, i |= ϕ ∨ ψ iﬀ v, i |= ϕ or v, i |= ψ
v, i |= Next ϕ iﬀ v, i + 1 |= ϕ
v, i |= Previous ϕ iﬀ v, i− 1 |= ϕ
v, i |= ϕ until ψ iﬀ (∃j ≥ i) (v, j |= ψ and for i ≤ k < j, v, k |= ϕ)
v, i |= ϕ since ψ iﬀ (∃j ≤ i) (v, j |= ψ and for j < k ≤ i, v, k |= ϕ)
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v, i |= ϕ release ψ iﬀ (∀j ≥ i) v, j |= ψ or (∃k ≥ i)(k < j and v, k |= ϕ)
v, i |= ϕ initiate ψ iﬀ (∀j ≤ i) v, j |= ψ or (∃k ≤ i)(k > j and v, k |= ϕ).
We can derive negation by extending · : P → P to Φ along the dual
pairs (,⊥), (∧,∨), (Next,Next), (Previous,Previous), (until,release) and
(since, initiate) — e.g. ϕ ∧ ψ = ϕ ∨ ψ, and ϕ ∨ ψ = ϕ ∧ ψ. Also, we can equate
Future ϕ with  until Next ϕ, and Future∀ ϕ with ⊥ release Next ϕ, etc.
As |= speciﬁes what P -worlds formulas in Φ describe, the next question is: what
about characterized events? For such a notion, a minimal condition of faithfulness
to |= is the following. Given a set A ⊆ Pow(Z × P ) of schedules, an integer i ∈ Z,
and a formula ϕ ∈ Φ, we say A i-portrays ϕ if for every function v : Z → Pow(P◦),
v, i |= ϕ iﬀ (∃s ⊆ xv) s ∈ A.
The aim of this subsection is to deﬁne for every pair (i, ϕ) ∈ Z × Φ, a set [[i, ϕ]] of
schedules satisfying Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.2 Let ϕ ∈ Φ and i ∈ Z.
(i) [[i, ϕ]] i-portrays ϕ.
(ii) If neither release nor initiate occurs in ϕ, then [[i, ϕ]] ⊆ Str (P ).
We deﬁne [[i, ϕ]] by induction on ϕ, with the base case [[i,⊥]] = ∅, [[i,]] = {∅} and
[[i, p]] = {{(i, p)}}. Inductively,
[[i, ϕ ∧ ψ]] = [[i, ϕ]]  [[i, ψ]] ( = {s ∪ r | s ∈ [[i, ϕ]], r ∈ [[i, ψ]]} )
[[i, ϕ ∨ ψ]] = [[i, ϕ]] ∪ [[i, ψ]]
[[i,Next ϕ]] = [[i + 1, ϕ]]
[[i,Previous ϕ]] = [[i− 1, ϕ]] .
As for until, the picture of [[0, p until q]] as now, q + now, p p
∗
q gen-
eralizes to
[[i, ϕ until ψ]] =
⋃
n≥0
(u(ϕ, n, i)  [[i + n,ψ]])
where u(ϕ, n, i) is deﬁned by induction on n ≥ 0 to witness ϕ between i and i + n:
u(ϕ, 0, i) = {∅} and
u(ϕ, n + 1, i) = [[i, ϕ]]  u(ϕ, n, i + 1) .
Temporally reversing until to get since, let
[[i, ϕ since ψ]] =
⋃
n≥0
(s(ϕ, n, i)  [[i− n,ψ]])
where s(ϕ, 0, i) = {∅} and
s(ϕ, n + 1, i) = [[i, ϕ]]  s(ϕ, n, i− 1) .
Turning to release, let us consider ﬁrst the special case ⊥ release ϕ, noting that
[[i,⊥ release ϕ]] is roughly the limit of u(ϕ, n, i) as n → ∞. More precisely, we
put
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[[i,⊥ release ϕ]] = {
⋃
n≥0
f(n) | f ∈ F+(ϕ, i)}
where F+(ϕ, i) is the set of functions f : N → Pow(Z × P ) such that for all n ≥ 0,
f(n) ∈ [[i + n,ϕ]]. Then set
[[i, ϕ release ψ]] = [[i, ψ until (ϕ ∧ ψ)]] ∪ [[i,⊥ release ψ]] .
Similarly, for initiate, let F−(ϕ, i) be the set of functions f : N → Pow(Z × P )
such that f(n) ∈ [[i− n,ϕ]] for all n ≥ 0, and set
[[i,⊥ initiate ϕ]] = {
⋃
n≥0
f(n) | f ∈ F−(ϕ, i)}
[[i, ϕ initiate ψ]] = [[i, ψ since (ϕ ∧ ψ)]] ∪ [[i,⊥ initiate ψ]] .
2.3 Schedules from sequences of strips
For p ∈ P , the single schedule {(n, p) | n ≥ 0} in [[0,⊥ release p]] can be pictured
topologically
now, p p
∞
= lim
n→∞
now, p p
n
.
over the space (X,O(X)), 3 provided X has enough points — e.g. if X contains all
P -worlds. By contrast, it is noteworthy that [[i, ϕ]] is deﬁned independently of the
choice X of points.
In general, we can reformulate the sets [[i, ϕ]] ⊆ Pow(Z× P ) of schedules as sets
〈〈i, ϕ〉〉 ⊆ N → Str(P ) of functions from N to Str(P ) such that
[[i, ϕ]] = {
⋃
n≥0
f(n) | f ∈ 〈〈i, ϕ〉〉}(8)
as follows. We
(i) turn A ⊆ Str(P ) into {λn.s | s ∈ A} ⊆ N → Str(P ) where λn.s is the constant
function mapping every n ∈ N to s
(ii) redeﬁne  on A,B ⊆ N → Str(P ) by
A  B = {λn.(f(n) ∪ g(n)) | f ∈ A and g ∈ B}
and
(iii) apply projection functions π, π′ of a pairing function on N to deﬁne
〈〈i,⊥ release ϕ〉〉 = {λn.h(π(n), π′(n)) | h ∈ F+(i, ϕ)}
where F+(i, ϕ) consists of functions h : N× N → Str (P ) such that for n ≥ 0,
λm.h(n,m) ∈ 〈〈i + n,ϕ〉〉
(and similarly for 〈〈i,⊥ initiate ϕ〉〉, with λm.h(n,m) ∈ 〈〈i− n,ϕ〉〉).
Steps (i) and (ii) lift Str(P ) to N → Str (P ), while step (iii) keeps us from ascending
further to N → (N → Str(P )) and beyond, by Currying and pairing
N → (N → Str(P )) ∼= (N× N)→ Str (P ) ∼= N → Str (P ) .
3 Recall that x is a limit point of a set A ⊆ X if every open set containing x intersects A− {x}.
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To bring out the subbasis {[[i, p]] | p ∈ P} for (X,O(X)), we can reduce the
functions f : N → Str (P ) in 〈〈i, ϕ〉〉 further to partial functions f : N⇁ (Z × P ) to
Z× P by re-analyzing A  B as {f ∧ g | f ∈ A and g ∈ B} with
(f ∧ g)(2n)  f(n)
(f ∧ g)(2n + 1)  g(n)
for n ≥ 0. There is little to choose between encoding a P -schedule as
{f(n) | n ∈ domain(f)} for some partial function f : N⇁ (Z × P )
or as
⋃
n≥0 f(n) for f : N → Str (P ). For a canonical system of approximations
relative to an enumeration P = {pn}n≥0 of P (which may repeat in case P is ﬁnite),
we let Sn, for n ≥ 0, be the set of {pm | m ≤ n}-strips with domain restricted to
integers whose absolute value is ≤ n
Sn = Pow({i ∈ Z | |i| ≤ n} × {pm | m ≤ n})
and deﬁne functions αn : Sn+1 → Sn mapping s ∈ Sn+1 to its intersection with
{i ∈ Z | |i| ≤ n} × {pm | m ≤ n}
αn(s) = {(i, pm) ∈ s | |i| ≤ n and m ≤ n} .
The inverse limit
lim
←−
Sn = {(sn)n≥0 ∈
∏
n≥0
Sn | sn = αn(sn+1) for all n ≥ 0}
of the projections (αn)n≥0 is isomorphic to the full set Pow(Z× P ) of P -schedules,
with (sn)n≥0 corresponding to
⋃
n≥0 sn, and conversely, x ⊆ Z× P decomposing to
({(i, pm) ∈ x | |i| ≤ n and m ≤ n})n≥0. But whereas the sets 〈〈i, ϕ〉〉 above can be
used to deﬁne [[i, ϕ]] according to (8), it is not clear how to construct the inverse
limit projections of [[i, ϕ]] without ﬁrst constructing [[i, ϕ]], given that future and
past operators may scope over each other in ϕ. (More in section 3.1 below.)
3 Strings over complex formulas
It is important that negated atomic formulas be allowed to appear in strings from
the previous section, as atomic formulas are not listed exhaustively. For applications
to natural language semantics, it is convenient to build strings from formulas that
can be quite complex. A wide class of examples is represented by Pat is gaining
weight , for which we might let ϕ be the formula
∃x (weigh(Pat,x) ∧ (∃y < x) Previous weigh(Pat,y))
and construct the regular language ϕ
+
for observations ϕ
n
of n+1 moments
(for n ≥ 1). Such applications aside, complex formulas are helpful in incremental
analyses of the sets [[i, ϕ]] from the previous section. For instance, the language
corresponding to [[1, (p ∧ ( until q)) until r]] can be analyzed incrementally as
L1 = now p, until q
∗
r(9)
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before unwinding it to a language over the alphabet Pow({now, p, q, r}). It turns
out that whereas L1 is regular (over an alphabet with the symbol p, until q
added), the language of [[1, (p∧( until q)) until r]] is not . To see this, it is useful
to formulate rules of the sort on which a tableau construction for Φ is based. More
generally, these rules resemble replace rules in ﬁnite-state tool-kits such as that in
[1].
3.1 Replacing Φ-schedules
We shall derive the sets [[i, ϕ]] incrementally by applying certain rules to the Φ-
schedule {(i, ϕ)}. For instance, the top four rule schemas in Table 2 suﬃce to turn
{(0, (Previous p) ∨Next q)} to the set [[0, (Previous p) ∨Next q]] consisting of
the P -schedules {(−1, p)} and {(1, q)}.
ϕ ∨ ψ  ϕ ϕ ∨ ψ  ψ
Next ϕ    ϕ  Previous ϕ  ϕ 
ϕ ∧ ψ  ϕ,ψ   
ϕ until ψ  ψ ϕ until ψ   ϕ ϕ until ψ
ϕ since ψ  ψ  ϕ since ψ  ϕ since ψ ϕ
ϕ release ψ  ϕ,ψ ϕ release ψ   ψ ϕ release ψ
ϕ initiate ψ  ϕ,ψ  ϕ initiate ψ  ϕ initiate ψ ψ
Table 2. Replace rules for ϕ,ψ ∈ Φ
The formal deﬁnitions are as follows. Given a string σ over the alphabet Pow(Φ)
and an integer i ∈ Z, let σi be the Φ-strip deﬁned recursively on σ by 	i = ∅ (where
	 is the empty string) and
(ασ)i = {(i, ϕ) | ϕ ∈ α} ∪ σi+1 .
Next, given a relation R ⊆ Pow(Φ)+×Pow(Φ)+ between strings, and Φ-schedules s
and s′, we say s′ R-succeeds s if for some (σ1, σ2) ∈ R, there exists i ∈ Z such that
σ1
i ⊆ s and s′ = (s − σ1
i) ∪ σ2
i .
(Hence, we can keep σ1 in s by arranging that σ1 ⊆ σ2.) When R is understood, we
shall write σ1  σ2 and s  s
′ for (σ1, σ2) ∈ R and s
′ R-succeeds s, respectively.
In the example above, we have (for R given by Table 2)
{(0, (Previous p) ∨Next q)}  {(0,Previous p)}  {(−1, p)}
and
{(0, (Previous p) ∨Next q)}  {(0,Next q)}  {(1, q)} .
Let ∗ be the reﬂexive transitive closure of  — i.e. s ∗ s′ iﬀ there is a ﬁnite
sequence s1, s2, . . . , sn of length n ≥ 1 such that s = s1, s
′ = sn and for 1 ≤ m < n,
sm  sm+1. Note that if s ∈ Str(P ) then there is no i ∈ Z such that s(i,⊥).
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Proposition 3.1 Let ϕ ∈ Φ and i ∈ Z. Relative to the rules from Table 2,
[[i, ϕ]] ⊇ {s ∈ Str (P ) | {(i, ϕ)} ∗ s}
and if neither release nor initiate occur in ϕ,
[[i, ϕ]] = {s ∈ Str (P ) | {(i, ϕ)} ∗ s} .
Before constructing inﬁnite chains of R-successors to analyze temporal formulas
built with release or initiate, we need to be careful to restrict applications of
the recursive rule schemas
ϕ until ψ  ϕ ϕ until ψ  ϕ since ψ  ϕ since ψ ϕ
to guarantee the second argument ψ is realized. Accordingly, let R′ be the set of
rules in Table 2 with these schemas deleted, and
ϕ until ψ n  ϕ
n
ψ n ϕ since ψ  ψ ϕ
n
(n ≥ 1)
put in their place. An i-derivation of ϕ is a function f : N → Str (Φ − {⊥}) such
that f(0) = {(i, ϕ)} and for all n ≥ 0,
f(n+ 1) R′-succeeds f(n) or f(n+ 1) = f(n) ∈ Str(P ) .
Let fP be the function λn.(f(n) ∩ (Z× P )) from N to Str(P ).
Proposition 3.2 For all ϕ ∈ Φ and i ∈ Z,
[[i, ϕ]] = {
⋃
n≥0
fP (n) | f is an i-derivation of ϕ}
and for every i-derivation f of ϕ and every n ≥ 0, fP (n) ⊆ fP (n + 1).
Returning to the example of [[1, (p∧( until q)) until r]] above, observe that q
may jump over r when replacing strings in (9), 4 and that the q’s never outnumber
the p’s. That is, identifying strips with strings, 5
[[1, (p ∧ ( until q)) until r]] ∩ now p
+
r q
+
=
now
∑
n≥1
∑
1≤m≤n
p
n
r q
m
4 The overlap in Next q r   q, r reﬂects the non-atomic structure of sets
as symbols (for strips), contrasting with NP VP  the dog,barked . In
www.stanford.edu/~laurik/fsmbook/examples/YaleShooting.html, Karttunen analyzes these sets as
strings within the framework of [1].
5 For deﬁniteness, let us agree to identify a P -strip with a string over the alphabet Pow(P ∪ {now}) that
neither begins nor ends with the empty set ; e.g. we identify {(1, r)} with now r , rather than any
of the other strings in ∗ now r ∗.
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which is not regular (by a pumping argument). So [[1, (p ∧ ( until q)) until r]]
cannot be regular. It does, however, contain the regular language
now
(
r + ( p, q + p )∗( p, q r + p ( q, r + r ∗ q ))
)
that 1-portrays (p ∧ ( until q)) until r. Indeed,
Proposition 3.3 For every ϕ ∈ Φ with no occurrence of release or initiate,
there is a regular language contained in [[0, ϕ]] that 0-portrays ϕ.
The regular language in Proposition 3.3 can be obtained by
(i) ﬁxing an enumeration ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn of all subformulas of ϕ such that ϕi is not
a subformula of ϕj for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n (hence ϕ1 = ϕ), and
(ii) feeding ∗ now,ϕ ∗ to a sequence R[ϕ1] ◦ R[ϕ2] ◦ · · · ◦ R[ϕn] of regular
relations R[ϕi] that apply rules from Table 2 with ϕi appearing on the left
hand side to strings left-to-right.
0-portrayal yields i-portrayal for any i ∈ Z, as we can alway preﬁx ϕ by i Next’s
for i > 0, or −i Previous’s for i < 0. Henceforth, let us speak simply of portrayal
(understood to mean 0-portrayal).
The sets [[i, ϕ]] are far from unique in satisfying Proposition 2.2. The empty
set portrays every contradiction, as does {∅} every tautology ϕ, whether or not
∅ ∈ [[0, ϕ]]. An obvious but important fact about portrayal is that if some set of
schedules portrays both ϕ and ψ, then ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent (in that
they are true at the same P -worlds); and conversely, if ϕ,ψ are logically equivalent,
then they are portrayed by the same sets of schedules. Portrayal is determined
completely by truth relative to worlds; characterization (of events) is a ﬁner grained
notion that is underdetermined by truth at worlds. No world can distinguish p
from p ∨ (p ∧ Next p), but any notion of characterization for event semantics (in
linguistics) must discern the diﬀerence in temporal extent between p and p∧Next p.
Tightening the ﬁt between a formula and a situation it characterizes (over that
between a formula and a situation it describes) is essential if, according to [16], we
are to account for causal relations pervasive in natural language.
3.2 Observation versus derivation
Let us call a temporal formula ϕ ∈ Φ ﬁnitely observable if [[i, ϕ]] ⊆ Str(P ) for some
(equivalently, any) i ∈ Z. Examples include temporal formulas with no occurrence
of release or initiate (Proposition 2.2(ii)). These are also ﬁnitely derivable by
Proposition 3.1, raising the question: can we sharpen Proposition 3.1 to
[[i, ϕ]] ∩ Str(P ) = {s ∈ Str(P ) | {(i, ϕ)} ∗ s} ?
No. Consider ⊥ release . As ∅ ∈ [[j,]] for all j ≥ i, λn.∅ belongs to F+(, i)
and so ∅ ∈ [[i,⊥ release ]]. On the other hand, there is no s ∈ Str (P ) such
that {(i,⊥ release )} ∗ s. Instead, {(i,⊥ release )}  {(i,⊥), (i,)}
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and {(i,⊥ release )}  {(i,), (i + 1,⊥ release )}. In sum, the formula
⊥ release  is ﬁnitely observable but not ﬁnitely derivable
[[i,⊥ release ]] = {∅} = {s ∈ Str (P ) | {(i,⊥ release )}∗ s} = ∅ .
The inequality above rests on conceptualizing an i-derivation f : N → Str (Φ) as
a computation that has at the nth stage f(n) processed the approximation fP (n) =
f(n)∩ (Z×P ). There is a striking similarity here to notions of stage and algorithm
investigated by Moschovakis; in particular, readers familiar with [11] might draw
the following analogies with Fregean sense and denotation.
observation
derivation
≈
value
computation
≈
denotation
sense
As the mode or manner of presenting denotation (value), sense (computation) can
be a very delicate matter, less robust than denotation (value). I would not claim
that a deﬁnitive account of sense for formulas in Φ necessarily exists, let alone that
the notion of derivation above provides such an account. The preceding discussion
of ⊥ release  brings out a problem with waiting for the end of an i-derivation
before “observing” the value under construction. The discussion also points to
a possible solution: step up to higher types and form the lambda term λn.∅ in
F+(, i). Type theory has in recent years been applied fruitfully to interpret (and
not only assemble) semantic representations for natural language (e.g. [14,4]). But
a worry noted by Sundholm (among others) some twenty years ago has persisted:
. . . it is not at all clear that one can export the ‘canonical proof-objects’ conception
of meaning outside the conﬁned area of constructive mathematics. In particular,
the treatment of atomic sentences such as OWN[x, y] is left intolerably vague . . .
and it is an open problem how to remove that vagueness. ([17], page 503)
T. Parsons has dubbed “the study of those ‘formulas of English’ that are treated
as atomic formulas in most logical investigations of English” subatomic semantics
([12], page ix), hypothesizing that events are the key to its mysteries. Assuming an
event can be formulated as a string (or, more precisely a P -strip, for some set P
of observations), it is natural to try out automata-theoretic methods (ﬁrmly estab-
lished in model checking [3] and various areas of natural language processing such
as morphology) before moving on to the more complex type-theoretic machinery of
proof-conditional semantics. Insofar as events in subatomic semantics can always
be put in the past, the strings that represent them must arguably be ﬁnite. The
complications inﬁnite strings pose are substantial enough for us to keep inﬁnite
strings out of subatomic semantics, if we can. For instance, [[1,⊥ release (p ∨ q)]]
is uncountable (for p = q), although its ﬁnite approximations now ( p + q )+
is trivial to generate. An instructive English example is
Pat stopped the car before it hit the tree.(10)
A postcondition of Pat stopping the car is that car be stationary. The car can
be assumed to remain stationary unless some force puts it in motion. As being in
motion is a precondition for hitting the tree, we may conclude from (10) that in the
absence of any intervening forces, the car did not hit the tree. To formalize such
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reasoning, it is convenient to pick out certain formulas as inertial , and for each
inertial ϕ, build a non-inertial formula Fϕ saying intuitively that a force is applied
on ϕ ([6]). We can then equate an inertial ϕ with the conjunction
(Fϕ release ϕ) ∧ Previous (Fϕ initiate Next ϕ)
which says not only that ϕ holds, but that it persists forward and backward in time
unless some force is applied on it. We can encode inertial persistence either through
the replace rule
 ϕ  Fϕ initiate Next ϕ Fϕ release ϕ
or, avoiding explicit reference to either release or initiate, through constraints
ϕ  ⇒  ϕ + Fϕ (11)
 ϕ ⇒ ϕ + Fϕ (12)
that deﬁne regular languages according to a modiﬁcation (from [7]) of constructs in
[1]. At any rate, (11), (12) and lexical rules such as
dawn + dusk ⇒ + noon +
suggest that derivations need not terminate as soon as all boxes in a string contain
only “atomic” propositions, contrary to the impression given by Table 2 (relative
to which strings over subsets of P are in normal form 6 ). It is doubtful that natural
language semantics has any use for irreplaceable propositions that are meant only
to be observed.
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